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Abstract 
The benefits of money as a medium of exchange are obvious, 
but  the  historical  origin  of  money  is  less  clear.  An  existing 
economic model of monetary search is reproduced as an agent-
based  simulation  and  an  evolutionary  algorithm  is  used  to 
model social learning. This approach captures the way in which 
different equilibria can arise, including solutions in which one 
or two goods come to be used as money. In the case where 
monetary  goods  have  identical  properties,  multiple  equilibria 
can be  reached with  a dependence on the starting  beliefs of 
agents.  In  our  analysis  we  also  consider  the  evolutionary 
dynamics  that  allow  for  a  small  chance  of  mutations  in 
strategies. In some cases our findings show evolutionary paths 
by which use of particular monetary goods can collapse. 
Introduction 
The  economy  is  a  complex  adaptive  system  (Beinhocker, 
2007).  Money  and  its  general  acceptance  as  a  medium  of 
exchange lie at the heart of most economic activity. Its use 
offers a convenient alternative to barter, allowing agents who 
share a belief in its acceptability to trade indirectly using a 
monetary good that offers them no direct utility. It also offers 
a decentralised alternative to personal credit arrangements if 
the acceptance of the money is widespread. 
  But  the  value  of  money  as  a  medium  of  exchange  only 
arises if that money is widely accepted. The initial growth in 
the acceptance of money involves the reinforcement of agent 
beliefs from repeated successful transactions with an emergent 
form  of  money,  and  does  not  require  any  centralised 
coordination. Building an agent-based model of such a system 
will allow us to assess the plausibility of different historical 
pathways to the emergence of money, and also to study the 
conditions  that  lead  to  a  collapse  in  the  acceptance  of  a 
particular  monetary  system,  a  topic  that  economic  models 
have so far neglected. 
  This  paper  begins  by  introducing  an  economic  search 
model  of  money  and  its  use  in  experiments  with  real  and 
artificial agents. This model is then implemented as an agent-
based  simulation  and  extended  to  allow  agents  to  learn 
successful trading strategies. Evolutionary paths towards the 
Nash equilibria are shown.  
A Search Model of Money 
Kiyotaki & Wright (1989) proposed a probabilistic search and 
matching model that can support monetary equilibria where 
useful  commodities  are  valued  as  media  of  exchange.  The 
economy consists of three types of agent (I, II and III) who 
can each hold a single unit of one of three goods (1, 2 and 3). 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Production and consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright 
model. Type I agents consume good 1 and produce good 2, 
type II agents consume good 2 and produce good 3, and type 
III agents consume good 3 and produce good 1 
 
Agents can produce one type of good, but only derive utility 
by consuming a different type of good. An agent will consume 
its  consumption  good  immediately,  and  will  produce  its 
production  good  after  consuming.  (Thus  an  agent  is  never 
empty-handed.) Since no agent produces its own consumption 
good, inter-agent trade is necessary for agents to derive utility. 
Agents  have  the  opportunity  to  trade  through  a  random 
matching process. In every time period, agents are randomly 
paired  and  given  the  opportunity  to  trade.  The  model  is 
designed to ensure that there exists no ‘double coincidence of 
wants’  (Jevons,  1875)  between  any  two  agents.  In  other 
words,  for  trade  to  take  place  at  least  one  agent  must  be 
willing  to  accept  a  good  other  than  its  consumption  good. 
(This  sets  the  stage  for  a  good  to  potentially  emerge  as  a 
medium  of  exchange.)  Trade  only  takes  place  when  both 
agents in a pair value their partner’s holding more highly than 
their  own.  Thus  agents  will  always  accept  their  own 
consumption  good  and  they  will  never  trade  with  an  agent 
holding the same good that they are already holding. 
  Trade in other goods depends on the trading strategies of 
agents.  To  differentiate  between  the  good  types,  the  model 
imposes different storage costs for each. Letting    denote the 
cost  of  holding  good  type     between  trading  turns,  then 
            , meaning that good 3 is the most costly to store 
and good 1 is the least costly. 
  Agents  attempt  to  maximise  their  expected  discounted 
lifetime utility. If they do not believe that any particular good 
will increase their chance of trading in a subsequent turn then 
they consider only the physical properties of the goods, and will only accept their consumption good or a commodity that 
is  cheaper  to  store  than  their  current  holding.  In  this 
fundamental  equilibrium  type  I  and  type  III  agents  will 
never trade directly, as type I agents aim to minimise costs by 
never accepting good 3 from type II agents. In a sense, type II 
agents are willing to use good 1 as money, but only because it 
is cheaper to store than their production good (3). 
  As Duffy (2001) points out: ‘An agent speculates when he 
accepts a good in trade that is more costly to store than the 
good  he  is  currently  storing  with  the  expectation  that  this 
more  costly-to-store  good  will  enable  him  to  more  quickly 
trade for the good he desires to consume.’ For a sufficiently 
high utility of consumption (or, equivalently, sufficiently low 
storage costs) type I agents are willing to accept good 3 from 
type II agents, allowing them to subsequently trade directly 
with type III agents for their consumption good. In this case a 
speculative equilibrium is supported; type I agents are now 
willing to use good 3 as money, even though it costs more to 
store than their production good (2). 
  The  trading  strategies  for  each  type  of  agent  can  be 
summarised  as           ,  meaning  that     is  the  favourite 
good and   is the least favourite good. The agent will trade 
any holding in exchange for good   (the agent’s consumption 
good), will trade holding   only in exchange for good  , and 
will trade holding   in exchange for any other good (Fig. 2).     
  
Equilibrium  Type I  Type II  Type III 
Fundamental  1   2   3  2   1   3  3   1   2 
Speculative  1   3   2  2   1   3  3   1   2 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Trading strategies and resulting trading patterns for the 
fundamental (left) and speculative (right) equilibria 
Extensions to the Search Model 
The original model presented only steady-state equilibria in 
pure strategies. Subsequent work has considered dynamic and 
mixed-strategy  equilibria  (Kehoe,  1993),  presenting  a  more 
generalised model where agents can alternate their play across 
their two available trading strategies.  
The routes by which a monetary equilibrium could become 
established  have  been  explored  using  both  analytical  and 
agent-based approaches (Alvarez, 2004). Replicator dynamics 
have been used to demonstrate analytically the dependence of 
an ultimate monetary equilibrium on initial conditions such as 
starting  strategies,  the  storage  costs  of  goods,  and  the 
proportions of different agent types in the economy (e.g., Luo, 
1999; Sethi, 1999).  
The  relevance  of  agent-based  approaches  to  economic 
modelling is well established (Vriend, 1994; Epstein & Axtell, 
1996; Gintis, 1997; Duffy, 2000; Tesfatsion, 2002).  Marimon 
et al. (1990) used classifier systems to allow agents to learn 
through  experience  those  actions  that  resulted  in  positive 
utility,  while  Duffy  (2001)  used  experiments  with  human 
subjects  to  appropriately  calibrate  an  agent-based  model. 
Başçi  (1999)  allowed  agents  to  learn  socially  through 
imitation.  In  general  both  agent-based  and  human  subject 
experiments found that social interaction encouraged the use 
of speculative strategies. 
Two hypotheses are tested in the following work: an agent-
based replication of the Kiyotaki-Wright model is used to test 
that  Kiyotaki  &  Wright’s  results  still  hold  for  small 
populations;  and  a  numerical  simulation  of  trading  strategy 
evolution is used to test the stability of monetary equilibria in 
the presence of strategy mutations. 
Finite Population Model 
Real economies consist of finite numbers of participants, with 
interesting economic behaviour exhibited even in very small 
economies.  Agent-based  simulation  allows  the  number  of 
interacting  agents  to  be  easily  selected.  The  infinite-
population  model  can  be  approximated  with  a  large 
population of several thousand agents, or population sizes less 
than a hundred can be used to see if the same results hold in 
small communities. Another advantage of running simulations 
with  small  populations  is  that  results  can  be  compared  to 
laboratory  data  from  behavioural  experiments.  Such 
experiments have typically used less than 30 agents playing a 
repeated game for less than 100 periods. 
Initialisation 
A population size is chosen and an initial population of agents 
is created, with an equal number of agents of each of the three 
types. For simplicity the population sizes were chosen to be a 
multiple  of  six  to  ensure  an  equal  distribution  across 
consumption  types  and  to  allow  all  agents  to  form  trading 
pairs. In the basic model the consumption type also uniquely 
defines the agent’s trading strategy, with all  agents playing 
fundamental strategies.  Agents  are  initially  holding  their 
production  goods,  representing  an  economy  with  no  initial 
endowments or natural resources. 
Trade 
Each turn agents are randomly paired into potential trading 
partnerships  and  attempt  to  trade  according  to  their  pre-
defined  trading  strategies,  just  as  in  the  Kiyotaki-Wright 
model.  If  a  successful  trade  results  in  an  agent  holding  its 
consumption good then that agent immediately consumes its 
holding and gains positive utility by doing so. That agent then 
immediately  produces  a  new  unit  of  its  production  good, 
which becomes its new holding. 
  At the end of every turn each agent pays the storage cost 
for its current holding. The utility of consumption ( ) and the 
storage costs for each good (  ,    and   ) are defined globally 
and are the same for each type of agent. Agents record their 
lifetime utility. When the model is expanded to allow agent 
trading strategies to evolve, this lifetime utility record will be 
used as a measure of the fitness of each agent. Results of the Agent-Based Model 
A single run of the simulation consists of the creation of a 
population of new agents, the interaction of those agents over 
a number of turns, and data collection to allow the behaviour 
of those agents to be summarised. 
  Data was collected for ease of comparison with the results 
presented in Kiyotaki & Wright (1989). This consisted of the 
stocks ( ) of each good at the end of the turn; the number of 
transactions  ( )  involving  that  good  during  the  turn;  the 
‘velocity’ ( ) of each good; and the ‘acceptability’ ( ) of each 
good. These last two values were chosen as two measures of 
the ‘moneyness’ of each good, with velocity (       ) a more 
traditional  measure  (Fisher,  1909)  showing  the  number  of 
transactions  weighted  by  the  supply  of  the  good  in  the 
economy, while acceptability (       ) is the probability that 
a good will be accepted in trade (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1992), 
weighting  transactions  by  the  number  of  times  a  good  is 
offered ( ). 
  Results of a single run are shown for a small population of 
90 agents (Fig. 3). Solid lines show the levels at the end of 
each  trading  turn.  Because  fundamental  equilibrium  trading 
strategies were imposed the system very quickly settles on the 
equilibrium  levels  for  stocks,  transaction,  velocities  and 
acceptabilities, taking less than 10 trading turns to do so. 
  To record these equilibrium levels, averages are calculated 
for each good from period 10 onwards, and shown as dotted 
lines.  Even  for  small  populations  the  results  are  consistent 
with large- and infinite-population models.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Results showing stocks, transactions, velocities, 
 and acceptabilities of three goods over time for a single run 
of the agent-based model with 90 agents 
Evolving Trading Strategies in the Agent-
Based Model 
The consistency with the infinite population results indicates 
that  an  agent-based  model  is  appropriate  for  studying  the 
emergence of monetary equilibria. The agent-based model can 
be modified to allow agents to adapt their behaviour. Instead 
of imposing unchanging equilibrium trading strategies on the 
agents,  agents  are  now  allowed  to  adjust  their  trading 
strategies based on their relative success. A basic evolutionary 
algorithm  was  used  to  allow  successful  preferences  to  be 
retained, unsuccessful preferences to be replaced, and new or 
forgotten preferences to emerge. 
  Instead of imposing equilibrium trading strategies, agents 
were  given  trading  strategies  that  were  initially  completely 
random.  Regardless  of  consumption  type,  agents  had  a  1/6 
probability  of  being  assigned  one  of  the  initial  trading 
strategies:  
 
1   2   3  1   3   2  2   1   3 
2   3   1  3   1   2  3   2   1 
 
  It is worth emphasising that these initial trading strategies 
are unlikely to be beneficial to the agent, as in many instances 
they  will  lead  to  an  agent  rejecting  its  consumption  good. 
However, the evolutionary model will allow agents to adapt 
their  trading  strategies  to  match  those  that  have  been 
successful  in  the  previous  generation,  allowing  us  to  test 
whether this model is sufficient for a monetary equilibrium to 
emerge. 
Trading Strategy Fitness 
The simulation is broken down into a number of generations 
( ), each consisting of a number of trading periods ( ). At the 
start of the first generation agents are given random trading 
strategies as described above. Play within a single generation 
is the same as described above, with agents being randomly 
paired  and  trading  when  both  agents  in  a  pair  prefer  their 
partner’s  holding  to  their  own,  given  their  current  trading 
strategy.  Agents  keep  track  of  their  lifetime  utility,  which 
increases  whenever  they  receive  and  consume  their 
consumption good, and decreases by the storage cost of their 
holding at the end of each trading turn. 
  At the end of each generation agents are ranked by their 
total  utility  across  all  the  trading  turns  in  that  generation. 
Agents  who  consume  a  relatively  large  amount,  or  spend 
fewer turns carrying the goods with the highest storage costs, 
will have the highest utilities within that generation. This total 
utility level is used as a measure of the fitness of that agent’s 
trading  strategy,  with  higher  fitness  trading  strategies  more 
likely to survive into subsequent generations.  
Imitation and Mutation of Trading Strategies 
The  agent  population  is  first  divided  by  consumption  type. 
Within  each  consumption  type,  the  80%  least  successful 
agents  are  discarded.  Each  of  the  most  successful  20%  of 
agents  then  produces  four  offspring,  so  that  the  population 
size remains unchanged between generations. 
  Offspring are initially a perfect copy of their parent, with 
the  same  consumption  type  and  the  same  trading  strategy. 
There  is  then  a  10%  chance  that  each  child  will  slightly 
mutate its trading strategy by swapping the order of two goods 
in its priority list. The two goods that are swapped in this way 
are chosen randomly with equal probability of any two goods 
being selected, i.e. the first and second item may be swapped 
with         , or the second and third item may be swapped 
with         . 
  This mutation mechanism means that at most two items are 
swapped in the trading strategy, with zero chance of a larger 
mutation or multiple mutations within a generation. Results of the Evolutionary Model 
In  all  cases  a  population  size  of  300  agents  (100  of  each 
consumption  type)  is  chosen.  Generations  consist  of     
     trading turns, and trading strategies are reproduced and 
mutated across        generations. 
  Results of the evolutionary model are plotted as charts that 
show the dominant trading strategies of each type of  agent 
against generational time. Coloured squares are used to show 
the  proportion  of  each  type  of  agent  using  a  given  trading 
strategy  in  a  given  generation.  Colours  represent  agent 
consumption type (type I in red, type II in green and type III 
in  blue),  with  the  intensity  of  that  colour  showing  the 
proportion  of  the  population who  are  choosing  that  trading 
strategy. Saturated colours represent a trading strategy chosen 
by all or most agents of a particular type, while very weak 
colours signify a trading strategy chosen by few or no agents 
of that type. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Agent-based evolution of speculative strategy  
(       ,       ,       ,       , average over 20 runs) 
 
  When utility of consumption is suitably high, type I agents 
benefit by adopting the speculative trading strategy, as shown 
in Fig. 4. Although it takes several generations for agents to 
adapt, they ultimately settle on the speculative equilibrium. 
  With  lower  utilities  for  consumption  (      ),  holding 
costs become increasingly significant and small populations of 
agents may not discover the fundamental equilibrium.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Failure to discover fundamental strategy  
(      ,       ,       ,       , average over 20 runs) 
 
Fig. 5 shows that type II agents prefer a trading strategy 
that permanently minimises their storage costs by accepting 
the lowest cost good (1) and never releasing it. Surprisingly, 
they do not learn to accept their own consumption good. This 
shows that agents in small-population runs of our model can 
adopt  and  persist  with  trading  strategies  that  were  not 
predicted by analytic approaches. The finding is intriguing but 
we expect that it would not occur given a larger population 
and  indeed  our  focus  here  is  not  on  the  discovery  of 
consumption goods (surely a no-brainer in evolutionary terms) 
but on the origins of monetary exchange.  
Evolving Trading Strategies in a Large 
Population Model  
An alternative to simulating the evolution of individual agent 
behaviours is to simulate the evolution of the population as a 
whole. In their original paper, Kiyotaki & Wright computed 
elements       of  a  population  array  p,  with  the  elements 
corresponding to the proportion of type   agents holding good 
  in the steady state reached after a number of trading steps. In 
Kiyotaki & Wright these 6 elements of p were sufficient to 
completely describe the population because each consumption 
type  held  a  fixed  (fundamental  or  speculative)  trading 
strategy. 
  To  study  the  evolution  of  trading  strategies  using  a 
population  array,  new  elements  need  to  be  added  to  allow 
agents of the same consumption type to use different trading 
strategies.  Following  a  methodology  similar  to  Luo  (1999) 
and Sethi (1999) who studied this problem analytically, the 
population array p is reconstructed using 12 elements, with 
each  element  of  the  array  representing  a  triplet  of 
consumption type, holding and trading strategy. 
  Each  consumption  type  is  now  permitted  two  trading 
strategies,  both  of  which  still  prioritise  that  type’s 
consumption  good.  The  interesting  question  in  monetary 
search  is  not  whether  an  agent  discovers  his  consumption 
good (which he must in order to gain any utility), but how that 
agent treats non-consumption goods in a monetary capacity. 
In  this  three-good  system  the  agent  can  prioritise  the 
remaining two non-consumption goods in two ways: either it 
can  prefer  to  hold  its  cheaper  non-consumption  good  (a 
fundamental trading strategy) or it can prefer to hold its more 
expensive  non-consumption  good  (a  speculative  trading 
strategy).  
  This is a slightly different labelling than employed in Sethi 
(1999), which treats consumption types as preferring to hold 
their  production  good  or  their  non-production  good.  In  the 
case of type I and type III agents, their production good is also 
the cheaper of their two non-consumption goods. But in the 
case  of  type  II  agents,  their  production  good  is  the  more 
expensive of their non-consumption goods. 
Initialising the population 
The  population  array  is  composed  of  twelve  elements 
corresponding  to  one  of  three  consumption  types,  each  of 
whom may hold one of their two non-consumption goods and 
one  of  two  trading  strategies  (fundamental  or  speculative). Each consumption type comprises one third of the population, 
and the population is initialised so that all agents are holding 
their  production  good.  The  proportion  of  each  trading  type 
following  each  of  their  two  possible  trading  rules  can  be 
varied. As an example, if all consumption types started with 
equal proportions playing each possible trading strategy, the 
initial elements of the population array would be: 
 
             6                                 6 
                            6                 
             6                                6 
                            6                 
   
where  the  subscripts  represent  consumption  type-(holding)-
trading strategy.  
Trading to a steady state in holdings 
After  initialisation  the  simulation  iterates  through  an  outer 
loop. At the beginning of the iteration all agents’ holdings are 
reallocated  to  the  production  goods  of  that  type.  Agents 
already  have  trading  strategies,  either  from  a  previous 
iteration or from initialisation.  
  The  population  shares  are  updated  to  reflect  repeated 
matching  by  agents  for  the  given  trading  strategies.  Any 
particular  match  between  type  i  and  j  will  occur  with 
probability     , with trade occurring if it is beneficial to both 
members of the pair as in all earlier models.  
  If  as  the result of  a  match  an  agent  ends  up  holding  its 
consumption good, it immediately consumes it and replaces it 
with its production good. The population share resulting from 
such a match is therefore added to the element corresponding 
to  that  agent’s  consumption  type,  trading  strategy  and 
production good. After multiple trading steps a steady-state in 
goods is reached.  
Replication of successful trading strategies 
When the holdings reach a steady state – i.e. the holdings on 
two  subsequent  turns  are  sufficiently  similar  (within  a 
specified tolerance level, set as      for the results in this 
paper) – the trading phase of the simulation terminates, and 
the  time-discounted  expected  lifetime  utilities  of  different 
types of agent are calculated. 
  Agents  are  given  a  great  degree  of  foresight  while 
calculating these expected lifetime utilities. For the reported 
results, agents were allowed to look-ahead 100 periods using a 
discount factor of      . . Any calculation with more than 
about  50  periods  is  a  good  approximation  to  an  infinitely-
lived, perfectly rational agent. 
  Agents of a given consumption type and holding are then 
allowed  to  imitate  each  other’s  strategies  based  on  their 
relative  expected  utilities.  A  discretised  version  of  the 
replicator  equation  (Weibull,  1995)  is  used  to  adjust  the 
population  shares  across  trading  strategies  for  each 
consumption  type-holding  pair.  The  population  share  for  a 
given consumption type ( ), holding (ℎ) and trading strategy 
( ) is updated as:  
 
                  +          −
             +               
       +        
   
where   ′  is  the  alternative  trading  strategy  for  the  same 
consumption  type-holding  pair,          are  the  expected 
discounted  lifetime  utilities  already  calculated,  and     is  a 
scaling  factor  used  to  represent  selection  pressure.  The 
proportion of the population using a particular trading strategy 
increases if that strategy yields a higher expected utility than 
the  population-weighted  average  of  the  two  alternative 
strategies,  at  a  speed  proportional  to  the  difference.  The 
proportion playing the less successful strategy will shrink. 
  After performing a single trading strategy update step, the 
population is reinitialised to hold their production goods and 
the  next  iteration  begins  with  a  new  round  of  trading  to  a 
steady  state  in  holdings.  This  process  continues  until 
successive updates of the entire outer loop produce no further 
change in trading strategy share. 
  After  each  trading  step  and  trading  strategy  update  the 
population  is  re-normalised  to  ensure  that  small  numerical 
errors do not result in the creation or destruction of holdings 
(during  the  trading  steps)  or  a  re-allocation  across 
consumption types (during strategy updates).  
  The same general results are obtained for less far-sighted 
agents.  The  number  of  future  time  periods  considered  in 
expected  utility  calculations  was  chosen  to  allow  relatively 
rapid  convergence  to  a  trading  strategy  equilibrium,  but 
limiting  this  amount  of  foresight  only  slows  the  learning 
process, it does not change the end result. As long as agents 
consider at least one period into the future, they are able to 
appreciate the benefits of a monetary good as a medium of 
exchange. 
Results of the Large Population Model 
A  variety  of  setups  were  used  to  explore  conditions  under 
which the different equilibria of the Kiyotaki-Wright model 
could be reached. 
  Results are visualised in the trading strategy space of the 
three agent types. Each consumption type can play one of two 
strategies: either the fundamental trading strategy that favours 
holding the lower numbered good (the cheaper good in the 
conventional  setup  of              ),  or  the  alternative 
speculative trading strategy that favours the higher numbered 
(more costly) good. 
  After each trading strategy update, the proportion of each 
consumption  type  playing  that  type’s  fundamental  strategy 
was recorded, and these proportions used to label the axes of a 
cube that describes the strategies of all agents in the economy. 
The  0  of  the  axis  corresponds  to  all  agents  playing  their 
speculative trading strategy, while 1 corresponds to all agents 
playing their fundamental trading strategy.  
  A selection of starting points was chosen (27 points formed 
by all possible combinations of [0.25, 0.5 and 0.75] across the 
three  consumption  types)  and  trading  strategies  allowed  to 
evolve under the rules described above. When plotted these 
evolving trading strategies tend to trace paths from a uniform 
three  dimensional  grid  in  the  centre  of  the  trading  strategy 
space towards one of the equilbria at the corners of the cube. 
This equilibrium  was dependent only on utilities and costs, 
and not on the particular starting trading strategies.  
  Results  show  a  representative  evolution  of  trading 
strategies  for  the  starting  mix  of  trading  strategies 
(1/2,1/2,1/2).       Storage costs and utilities have been chosen for consistency 
with Duffy (2001), with       ,        and       .  
Fundamental Equilibrium 
With       , all paths rapidly converge on the fundamental 
equilibrium (1,1,1), with all agents preferring lower storage 
cost goods to higher storage cost goods (type I: 1   2   3, 
type II: 2   1   3, type III: 3   1   2).  
 
Fig. 6. Fundamental equilibrium (rapid convergence) 
 
Increasing  the  utility  of  consumption  increases  the 
incentive for type I agents to speculate and experiment with 
holding  a  monetary  good,  as  the  benefits  of  more  frequent 
trade are greater relative to the fixed costs of holding goods. 
With          (and  costs  unchanged)  trading  strategies  still 
converge  on  the  fundamental  equilibrium,  but  far  more 
slowly.  
Although  type  II  agents  still  converge  rapidly  on  their 
fundamental trading strategy, there is very little evolutionary 
pressure  for  a  mixed  population  of  both  fundamental  and 
speculative  type  I  agents  to  move  towards  the fundamental 
trading  strategy,  as  the  expected  utilities  of  either  trading 
strategy are very similar.  
 
Fig. 7. Fundamental equilibrium (slow convergence) 
Speculative Equilibrium 
When the utility of consumption is sufficiently high, type I 
agents can increase their expected utility by accepting good 3 
from type II agents. The additional expense of holding this 
high storage cost good is offset by the increased expectation 
of  direct  trade  with  type  III  agents  for  good  1,  the  type  I 
agents’ consumption good.  
  Kiyotaki & Wright calculate the critical level at which type 
I agents should speculate as dependent on the level of utility, 
the holding costs and the proportions of type II and type III 
agents  who  are  holding  good  1.  Type  I  agents  should 
speculate if     −            −         (Kiyotaki & Wright, 
1989).  
  This  can  be  seen  when  the  utility  of  consumption  is  set 
sufficiently high, with         in Fig. 8.  Convergence to this 
speculative  equilibrium  occurs  rapidly,  with  all  three 
consumption types converging on their equilibrium strategy in 
similar timescales. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Speculative equilibrium 
 
To  produce  Fig.  8  an  appropriate  speed  of  trading  strategy 
replication ( ) needed to be chosen. Lower values of   mean 
that the system takes longer to reach an equilibrium, but the 
more gradual replication of trading strategies stops strategies 
from becoming caught at alternative equilibriums.  
This  occurs  because  a  trading  strategy  can  only  be 
replicated if it still exists within the population. Once entirely 
eliminated, the replicator equation used above will not allow a 
trading strategy to re-emerge, as it has a zero weighting in the 
population average. If   is too high those paths that pass close 
to the corners (1,1,0) and (1,1,1) may become trapped at these 
alternative  equilibria  before  reaching  the  speculative 
equilibrium (0,1,1).  
As well as slowing down the speed of convergence, another 
way to ensure that the system does not approach a sub-optimal 
equilibrium  due  to  these  numerical  errors  is  to  introduce  a 
small  mutation  rate  that  allows  extinct  trading  strategies  to 
reappear. In the cases discussed above such a mutation rate 
will  only  temporarily  move  the  system  away  from  the 
equilibrium, but becomes interesting in the case of a mixed 
equilibria system. Multiple Equilibria 
This  framework  which  had  been  used  to  reproduce  the 
evolutionary dynamics described analytically in Sethi (1999) 
can  also  be  used  to  consider  the  case  of  identical  goods, 
proposed in an example in  Luo (1999). If goods are either 
identical or very similar, the particular type of money used in 
the economy may have a sensitive dependence on the initial 
mix of agent trading strategies.  
By  relaxing  the  cost  ordering  of  Kiyotaki-Wright  and 
setting the storage cost of goods equal (                ), the 
particular  monetary  equilibrium  depends  only  on  the  initial 
trading strategies used by agents, as shown in Fig. 9 where 
(1/3,2/3,1/3) is a critical point around which trading strategies 
significantly  diverge.  Trading  strategies  started  at  the  125 
points formed  by  allowing  each  starting  trading  strategy  to 
diverge from this critical point by [-0.02, -0.01, 0, 0.01, 0.02].  
 
Fig. 9. Multiple equilibria for identical goods  
(       ,                 ) 
  
  Trading strategies can end at one of the three ‘speculative’ 
equilibria, shown in red (0,0,0), green (0,1,1) and blue (1,1,0), 
or at an equilibrium (shown in grey) where one consumption 
type  continues  to  be  composed  of  agents  playing  both 
‘fundamental’ and ‘speculative’ strategies.  
The labels ‘fundamental’  and ‘speculative’ are no longer 
meaningful  as  all  goods  have  an  identical  holding  cost. 
However,  the  particular  good  that  is  used  as  a  medium  of 
exchange depends on the  equilibrium point that is reached, 
which depends only on the starting mix of trading strategies: 
(0,1,1): Type I accept good 3, type II accept good 1 
(0,0,0): Type III accept good 2, type I accept good 3 
(1,1,0): Type II accept good 1, type III accept good 2 
Strategy Mutation 
With  trading  strategy  imitation  described  by  the  replicator 
equation,  once  agents  reach  an  equilibrium  (at  a  corner  or 
edge of the trading strategy space) they will remain there, as 
there is no process for forgotten strategies to be rediscovered. 
Allowing a small degree of trading strategy mutation after 
the  replication  phase  allows  forgotten  trading  strategies  to 
return.  Each  consumption  type-holding  pair  is  mutated 
independently.  In  each  case  a  random  number  is  drawn 
uniformly from the interval [-0.001, +0.001] and multiplied by 
the proportion of the population playing either trading strategy 
in this pair. The proportion of agents playing the fundamental 
trading  strategy  is  then  increased  by  this  amount,  and  the 
proportion playing the speculative trading strategy decreased 
by the same amount, with a normalisation step to ensure that 
this does not result in either proportion becoming less than 
zero.  
  In the case of the fundamental and speculative equilibria 
discussed above these mutations have little effect. Mutations 
cause  the  trading  strategies  to  fluctuate  around  the 
equilibrium,  but  strategy  replication  takes  the  system  back 
towards it. 
  However,  in  the  case  of  the  mixed  equilibria,  strategy 
mutations can drive the system around the edges of the trading 
strategy  space,  permitting  sudden  transitions  from  one 
monetary  equilibrium  to  another.  Starting  from  the 
equilibrium  at  (0,1,1),  the  results  of  strategy  mutations  are 
shown in Fig. 10.  
 
Fig. 10. Trading strategy mutation shifts monetary equilibria 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Cycling through trading strategy equilibria Fig.  11  shows  the  speed  of  these  transitions.  Trading 
strategies initially move slowly along the edge of the trading 
strategy  space.  Along  these  edges  one  consumption  type  is 
split  into  players  playing  both  fundamental  and  speculative 
trading strategies, while the other two consumption types are 
playing  a  single  strategy.  The  mutation  step  allows  these 
single-strategy  players  to  experiment  with  their  alternative 
strategy, which provides an additional incentive for the two-
strategy  player  to  shift  in  favour  of  the  second  strategy. 
Ultimately  a  critical  point  is  reached  where  enough  of  the 
current two-strategy players are playing the second strategy to 
cause the rapid transition to a new equilibrium. At this point 
the  two-strategy  player  has  an  incentive  to  play  only  their 
second  strategy,  and  a  new  consumption  type  begins 
experimenting with their alternative strategy.  
  This shows how the gradual shift in the acceptance of one 
type of money by one type of agent can tip the population 
structure to the point where an entirely new good becomes 
accepted as money. 
For  instance,  in  the  initial  move  from  (0,1,1)  towards 
(0,0,1), with a sudden transition to (0,0,0): Initially good 3 is 
used as money by type I and good 1 is used as money by type 
II. Type II agents then increasingly refuse to accept good 1, 
driving the system towards an equilibrium where their own 
production good is the unique monetary good. However, at a 
critical  point  the  system  shifts  as  type  III  agents  begin 
accepting good 2 as a monetary good.  
  This process repeats. In each case an agent shifts its trading 
strategies  in  favour  of  creating  a  monopoly  in  money 
production, ultimately resulting in a shift that begins a cycle 
where  the  original  agents  production  good  is  rejected  as 
money entirely. 
Discussion 
It is encouraging that the models of Kiyotaki & Wright (1989) 
and Sethi (1999) can be reproduced in both agent-based and 
numerical  simulations  that  support  the  original  analytic 
results.  The  findings  presented  here  explicitly  confirm  the 
infinite-population  based  estimates  of  Sethi  in  the  limit  of 
very small population size and in the presence of noise in the 
evolutionary dynamics. 
  Speculative, fundamental, and mixed equilibria can each be 
supported  if  appropriate  consumption  utilities  and  storage 
costs are chosen. If goods are homogenised by setting their 
storage  costs  to  be  equal,  multiple  equilibria  can  also  be 
supported;  this  finding  provides  a  way  in  to  modelling 
problematic phenomena such as competing currencies (Hayek, 
1976) or monetary collapse.  
There are many  ways in which this framework could be 
extended.    One  of  the  most  obvious  would  be  to  consider 
more realistic economies in which more than three types of 
agents trade more than three types of goods; in which goods 
differ  in  their  properties  such  as  durability;  and  in  which 
prices  can  vary.  Another  line  of  extension  would  be  to 
investigate the effect an evolution that is constrained to real-
world social networks has on monetary search. The current 
model assumes a complete trading network, where any two 
agents may meet and attempt to trade with equal probability. 
Real trading environments tend to have strong cultural, social 
or  geographical  roots,  suggesting  that  investigating  the 
evolution  subject  to  more  constrained  interaction  patterns 
could be an important step in motivating the maintenance of 
multiple competing currencies.  
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